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MAINTENANCE OF
INTERSPOUSAL TORT SUITS CONTROLLED BY THE
LAW OF THE DOMICILE
Thompson v. Thompson
105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963)
Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile being driven by defendant
husband, suffered injuries in an accident allegedly resulting from his
gross negligence. The parties were domiciled in New Hampshire, but the
accident occurred in Massachusetts. The New Hampshire married women's
statute had been found "to wholly remove the disability of coverture in
respect of wrongs, and place married women upon an entire equality with
their husbands . . . 2 thus permitting interspousal tort actions. On the
other hand, the Massachusetts statute 3 has been interpreted as disallowing
tort actions between husband and wife.4 The trial court found that the
right of the wife to maintain an action in tort against her husband is
determined by the law of the state where the accident occurred. Since
New Hampshire had previously recognized the Massachusetts rule,5 the
trial court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
reversed and remanded, expressly overruling one case 6 and effectively
overruling others 7 on the grounds that the right is determined by the
law of the domicile.8
The principal case is in the mainstream of two separate trends in the
law. The first is that which permits maintenance of tort actions between
spouses; the second, in the tort conflicts area, is the trend away from
the lex loci delictus to the lex loci domicilii in resolving issues arising from
a familial relationship between the parties.
1 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 460:2 (1955):
Every married woman shall have the same rights and remedies, and shall be
subject to the same liabilities in relation to property held by her in her own
right, as if she were unmarried, and may convey, make contracts, and sue
and be sued, in all matters in law and equity, and upon any contract by her
made, or for any wrong by her done, as if she were unmarried.
2 Seaver v. Adams, 66 N.H. 142, 144, 19 Atl. 776, 777 (1890).
3 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209, § 6 (1955): "A married woman may sue and be
sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits
between husband and wife."
4 Callows v. Thompson, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).
5 Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357, 358, 53 A2d 515, 516 (1947). The court
states: "The law of Massachusetts is well settled . . . that a wife cannot maintain an
action of tort against her husband."
6 Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934).
7 Morin v. Letourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959) ; Levlock v. Spanos,
101 N.H. 22, 131 A2d 319 (1957) ; Boisvert v. Boisvert, supra note 5; Robinson v.
Dixon, 91 N.H. 29, 13 A.2d 163 (1940); Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 89 N.H.
272, 197 Atl. 330 (1938).
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Historically, the wife could not maintain a suit in her own right,
much less sue her husband in tort since, "by marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law .... [T]he very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of [the] husband: under whose wing, pro-
tection, and cover, she performs every thing ..... ,9 This theory began
to lose its adherents in the middle of the nineteenth century when the
married woman's acts emerged.10 Though these early statutes revolu-
tionized the field of family law, the courts first interpreted the statutes
as limited in their application to property rights.1' In the field of personal
torts, less than half of the courts continue thus to construe the statutes
narrowly.' 2 The majority of jurisdictions permit interspousal tort suits
by means of a broad interpretation of the married woman's statute or by
legislative enactment. 13
Two of the policies underlying the prohibition of interspousal suits
are the preservation of domestic tranquility and the avoidance of trivial
suits. One writer, however, points out that there is usually little domestic
tranquility left at the point where a spouse wishes to sue. As to trivial
suits, he feels that suits arising from unimportant acts, technically torts,
could be avoided by recognizing an implied consent or license arising from
the marriage relation. When more serious injuries occur, he continues,
a grave injustice is often worked by denial of a legal remedy.14 Recognizing
that insurance is usually involved in such suits, another writer states,
3Y 15
"The real dangers are too much-not too little-family harmony....
An additional consideration for permitting such suits is based upon the
emergence of liability insurance and its wide-spread use in our society.
Dean Prosser points out that:
Where there is [liability] insurance, it becomes still more
difficult to maintain most of the stock arguments against recovery.
Since the defendant will not have to pay out of his own pocket, it
is obvious that the family exchequer will not be diminished, and
that domestic harmony will not be disrupted so much by allowing
9 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 442 (1771).
10 Collected in 3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 167, 179, 180 (1935).
13 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 10, § 167.
12 Prosser, Torts 882 (3d ed. 1964). See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 76 Nev. 302, 352
P2d 833 (1960) ; Rodgers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961) ; Rubalcava
v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P2d 389 (1963) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W.Va.
245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960) ; Farage, "Recovery for Torts Between Spouses," 10 Ind.
L.J. 290 (1935); Notes, 30 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 343 (1952); Note, 42 Ky. L.J. 497
(1954) ; Note, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 717 (1954).
'3 See cases listed in 42 Ky. L.J., supra note 12, at 498 n. 4. See also N.Y. Gen.
Obl. Law § 3-313, which states: "A married woman has a right of action for an injury
to her person, property or character or for an injury arising out of the marital relation,
as if unmarried." The precursor statute, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57, is discussed in
Vernier, American Family Law § 180 (Supp. 1938).
14 3 Vernier, supra note 10, § 180, at 269.
15 James, "Tort Law In Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process," 8
Buffalo L. Rev. 315, 335 (1959).
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the action as by denying it; and since the insurer is the party
really interested in the defense, any conception of family unity
can scarcely protect him. On the other hand, of course, the danger
of collusion between the injured person and the insured, always
present in liability insurance cases, is considerably increased by
the family relation.18
Most courts, however, have been reluctant to use the existence of liability
insurance as an occasion to permit one spouse to sue the other in a tort
action, while other courts recognize that the law is unsettled.17
A final factor which may contribute to the new direction in the law
is the gradual abandonment of fault in determining liability. Under the
doctrine of Brown v. Kendall 18 negligence was the criteria for establishing
liability. However, beginning with Fletcher v. Rylands, 19 cases in various
tort areas have emerged based on a strict liability doctrine.20 One noted
writer has recently advocated that other areas should be included.21 Recent
proposals in regard to automobile injuries have encouraged the movement
by advocating indemnity without regard to negligence.22 In the area of
guest statutes there has also been a trend toward liberality in indemnifying
the injured.2 "
If insurance becomes compulsory and the fault principle is abandoned,
the view which permits interspousal suits should become more prevalent.
16 Prosser, Torts 677 (2d ed. 1955). See Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214
N.W. 305 (1927) ; Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
17 Boisvert v. Boisvert, supra note 5. Cf. Blakemore, Massachusetts Motor Vehicle
Law § 295 (1946) which says: "The court has not yet settled the question whether
the existence of liability insurance enables the wife to sue the husband for negligent
operation, but a very strong argument might well be made for liability of the insurance
company if its policy covers the case."
18 Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
19 Fletcher v. Rylands, [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338. Cf. Brown v. Collins, 53
N.H. 442 (1873), which rejected the Fletcher doctrine.
20 See generally, Restatement, Torts §§ 519, 520 (1938) ; Witman Hotel Corp. v.
Elliott, 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951) (blasting) ; Prentiss v. National Airlines,
112 F.Supp. 306 (D. NJ. 1953) (airline crash) ; Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489,
190 P.2d 1 (1948) (pest eradication).
21 James, supra note 15, at 337. Cf. Keeton, "Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 419 (1959), who explains the existing areas of strict
liability on the basis of shifting the risk to one who is morally blameworthy.
22 See Green, Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance (1958) ; Ballantine, "A
Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1916);
Dowling, "Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium," 32 Colum. L. Rev.
785 (1932). See also Blum & Kalven, "Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem-Auto Compensation Plans," 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 641 (1964), for a general
discussion of the area.2 3 Annot., 10 A.L.R2d 1351 (1950). See Collins v. Rydman, 344 Mich. 588, 74
N.W. 2d 900 (1956), in which the occupant accompanied the driver to help pick up
costumes and such circumstances were sufficient to go to the jury; Kizer v. Bowman,
256 N.C. 565, 124 S.E2d 543 (1962), in which an occupant paid one-half of the gas
and oil and was ruled not a guest; Gilliland v. Singleton, 204 Va. 115, 129 S.E2d 641
(1963), in which a member of a car pool was ruled not a guest.
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The achievement of justice would far outweigh the alleged disadvantages
of such a practice. It was against this background of liberality toward
recovery that the New Hampshire court in the instant case was called
upon to apply either its own liberal law or the comparatively harsh Massa-
chusetts doctrine.
This conflict between the laws of the two states set the stage for
the second and more interesting determination. The second trend followed
in the instant case is that away from the les loci delictus toward the lex
loci dornicilii in tort actions when family relationship exists between the
parties. The court in the principal case could have followed its decision in
Gray v. Gray which held the lex loci delictas to control.2 4 However, the
court preferred to overrule Gray and to join several other jurisdictions
by declaring the lex loci domnicilii to control.
In England, torts did not become an independent subject of conflicts
law until the middle of the nineteenth century.25 The assumption that
foreign law governs the tort action first appeared in 1883.26 An elaborate
footnote in Story's chapter on crime became the basis for the fateful propo-
sition that "the true doctrine .. . proceeds upon the broad ground of the
right of action given by the law of the foreign state .... ,, 27 Nineteen years
later, Mr. Justice Holmes adopted the view in the leading American case,
stating that the lawfulness of an act "must be determined wholly by the
law of the country where the act is done." 28 The original Restatement 21
followed this view and has until recently been used as the basis for the
application of the lex loci delictus. However, a recent tentative draft,
drawing on recent cases, suggests that since the domicile jurisdiction has
the most significant relationship to the parties in an interspousal tort
action, its law should apply.39
24 Gray v. Gray, supra note 6.
25 Smith, "Torts and the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Mod. L. Rev. 447, 450-52 (1957).
26 Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883).
27Id. at 845 n. (a), relying on dictum in Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11, 18
(1880).
28 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
29 Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 384, 377 (1934) :
§ 384. (1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a
cause of action will be recognized in other states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no re-
covery in tort can be had in any other state.
§ 377. The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.
3 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 379, 390g (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963):
§ 379. (1) The local law of the state which has the most significant rela-
tionship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and
liabilities in tort.
§ 390g. Whether one member of a family is immune from tort liability to
another member of the family is determined by the local law of the state of
their domicile.
The reporter relies upon Pirc v. Kortebein, 186 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1960);
Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P2d 218 (1955) ; Pittman v. Deiter, 10 Pa. D. &
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Brainerd Currie has observed that since the decision in Grant v.
McAuliffe, 31 the California Supreme Court has made "serious efforts to
break away from sterile formalism and to develop a rational approach to
conflict-of-laws problems." 32 This same court later handed down a land-
mark decision in Emery v. Emery 33 in which the court used this rational
approach toward conflict-of-laws questions involving family immunities,
and intimated the forthcoming change suggested by the tentative draft.
In Emery two daughters and the mother sued the father and the son, the
owner and driver respectively, for the negligent operation of an automobile
which resulted in injuries to the daughters. The accident occurred in Idaho.
Though the court dismissed the mother's complaint for failure to join
the father, the daughters recovered under the applicable California law.34
The law of Idaho, the place of the accident, was ignored. The court rea-
soned its decision as follows:
It is not, however, a question of tort, but one of capacity to sue
and be sued and as to that question the place of the injury is both
fortuitous and irrelevant. ... [I]mmunities from suit because
of a family relationship are more properly determined by reference
to the law of the state of the family domicile. That state has the
primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the inci-
dents of the family relationship and it is the only state in which
the parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, effect
a change in those incidents.35
Emery can be distinguished on its facts from the instant case; however,
the above dictum regarding family immunity set the stage for further
decisions. The next important ruling was Haunschild v. Continental Cas.
Co. 30 where, as in the principal case, the wife sued her husband in tort.
The state of the domicile, Wisconsin, allowed such suits, but the state
where the accident occurred, California, did not. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the law of the domicile controlled. Both of these decisions
relied extensively on a law journal article which concluded that we must
separate status and tort and permit each to be determined by its appropriate
conflict rule. 37
C2d. 360 (1957) ; Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W2d 443 (1962) ; Haum-
schild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) ; and Bodenhagen
v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 306, 95 N.W2d 822 (1959), for his statement of
the general principle.
31 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P2d 944 (1953).3 2 Currie, "Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In the Conflict
of Laws," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 208 (1958), discussing Grant v. McAuliffe, supra note
31, in which the law of the domicile (providing for survival) and not the law of the
place of injury (providing for abatement) was applied.
33 Emery v. Emery, supra note 30.
34 Cal. Civ. Code § 3523 states: "For every wrong there is a remedy."
35 Emery v. Emery, supra note 30, at 427-28, 289 P2d at 222-23.36 Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., supra note 30.
37 Ford, "Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws,"
15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1954).
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The court in the principal case through citation suggested two reasons
for its decision that the lex loci delictus should no longer be applied to
determine the interspousal rights of parties domiciled in the forum state.
The court reiterated the basic conflicts argument that foreign law is never
compulsory if it contravenes the public policy of the forum. The court
had previously ruled that foreign substantive law would not be allowed
in such cases.3 8 Further, the court refused to acknowledge a distinction
between the law controlling status and that controlling the incidents of
status. This proposition was expressly reflected in the sentence, "We
consider that the incidents of the status of marriage of parties domiciled
here should not be determined by the law of another jurisdiction merely
because they chance to be involved in an accident there." 39 The court
supported this reason by noting the trend in other jurisdictions 40 and in
the Restatement. 41
The decision in the principal case, like most conflict cases, may raise
a problem of forum shopping. If a New Hampshire couple have an acci-
dent in Massachusetts, an interspousal suit might be instituted in either
the Massachusetts or New Hampshire court. If an action were brought
in Massachusetts, the court would apply the lex loci delictus and the suit
would be dismissed.42 However, if the suit were instituted in New Hamp-
shire the lex loci domicilii would control and the action would be allowed
as the principal case holds. On the other hand, if the couple were domiciled
in Massachusetts and had an accident in New Hampshire, the opposite
would result in the respective courts. In the New Hampshire litigation,
the law of the domicile, Massachusetts, would control.43 Therefore, the
New Hampshire courts by applying Massachusetts substantive law would
38 Robinson v. Dixon, supra note 7. See also Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155
Atl. 47 (1931).
39 Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 8, at 89, 193 A.2d at 441. The principal
case was not the first case in the jurisdiction to recognize the growing trend, for dictum
in Morin v. Letourneau, supra note 7, at 311, 156 A.2d at 132 stated, "Recent develop-
ments in the field of conflict of laws indicate support in interspousal or family suits,
arising out of wrongs committed in foreign jurisdictions, for the view that the rights
of the parties should be determined in accordance with the law of the domicile of the
parties."
40 See cases cited supra note 30.
41 See Restatement, supra note 29; Restatement (Second), supra note 30.
42 See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., supra note 3. The statute has been applied to non-
residents. See Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 303 Mass. 275, 21 N.E2d 244 (1939), in
which the wife's suit setting aside the husband's allegedly fraudulent conveyance was
dismissed. Both were New York residents. In Charney v. Charney, 316 Mass. 580, 55
N.E2d 917 (1944), the wife, a resident of New York, was prevented under the statute
from maintaining a suit to recover arrears in payments of a separation agreement
against the resident husband.
4 3 This introduces the problem of renvoi, a doctrine under which the court in re-
sorting to foreign law adopts also the foreign rules on conflicts of laws. Therefore, if
New Hampshire were to adopt Massachusetts law and its rules on conflict of laws,
which state New Hampshire laws control, New Hampshire would have to adopt its
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dismiss the suit. If the suit, though, were brought in Massachusetts, the
court would apply the lex loci delictus and allow the suit.
To avoid forum shopping and confusion in policy, the jurisdictions
will have to find a consistent meeting ground. The best answer appears
to be that interspousal conflict questions should be resolved by applying
the law of the jurisdiction which has the most significant relationship to
the parties-the law of the domicile.
own laws which adopt the Massachusetts law. This would lead one around in circles
forever. The doctrine, however, has been almost universally rejected and the courts
will apply only the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction and not its laws on
conflicts. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 2 (1964) ; 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws
§ 7 (1939); and Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1170, 1173
(1938), in which the author concedes that the overwhelming weight of authority is
against the renvoi doctrine, although he favors it.
